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 1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to develop a comprehensive theoretical and empirical
assessment of ﬁrm strategic behavior under ﬁnancial market uncertainty. The ﬁrms
choose pricing strategies in a diﬀerentiated retail product market. A general theoret-
ical model of market value maximization (MVM) is constructed using a traditional
capital asset pricing format.
We develop and implement a model built on the nonlinear Almost Ideal Demand
Systems (AIDS) and structural ﬁrst-order conditions. By full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) estimation, the AIDS model evaluates pricing strategies in the U.S.
margarine and butter retail markets using 4-week interval scanner data from 1998 to
2002. We estimate the price elasticities of demand for leading brands and investigate
the degree of market power in this industry.
The MVM model suggests Lerner indexes derived from proﬁt maximization will be
estimated above their true values. This is a simple misspeciﬁcation bias that ignores
the returns required to compensate ﬁrms for nondiversiﬁable risk. This is a crucial
ﬁnding in light of the current state of industrial organization work and antitrust law.
Testable hypotheses generated from the theoretical structure are also evaluated.
By the Wald and likelihood ratio tests, the model of proﬁt maximization is rejected in
favor of the MVM structure, and we conclude that ﬁnancial market uncertainty plays
an important role in the pricing behavior of ﬁrms in this industry. The result suggests
that models of pure proﬁt maximization may be largely misspeciﬁed. The Vuong and
Wald tests rule out a stable benchmark equilibrium outcome (i.e. Bertrand, Stackel-
berg, etc) suggesting that market power varies and is derived from a combination of
structural factors in the market. Finally, the results of our model are compared to
that of a commonly presumed market structure: Bertrand pricing. The results indi-
1cate fairly large diﬀerences in measured outcomes of elasticities and Lerner indexes
of market power. This underscores the importance of getting the market structure
correct before proceeding with subsequent empirical analysis.
The research in this paper provides several important additions and extensions to
the literature. First, we are not aware of any previous attempt to estimate a ﬂexible
demand system while introducing ﬁnancial market risk into the market structure.
Second, this is a very large system comprised of three brands, an aggregation of all
other brands and an aggregation of private labels. Most previous brand level studies
have either worked with multiple brands in the pricing system alone, or worked with
a few brands, and used linear ad hoc demand systems to estimate the full demand
system. This study, therefore represents a full extension of the AIDS model to address
pricing and ﬁnancial risk in a disaggregated system. Third, there has been no previous
attempt to evaluate pricing strategies in the U.S. margarine and butter retail markets.
The remainder of this section contains discussions of the demand system, roles of
risk, capital asset pricing model, and new empirical industrial organization approach.
1.1 Almost Ideal Demand System
The analysis of strategic behavior of ﬁrms using a structural model is widely used
in the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) literature. In many cases, re-
searchers simplify the structural model by specifying ad-hoc or approximated demand
speciﬁcations, and reduced form conditions because of the complexity of ﬂexible de-
mand and cost functions. However, ad-hoc demand speciﬁcations do not satisfy all
the requirements of consumer theory.
Pioneered by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, b), the AIDS approach has been
extensively used in the economics, marketing and agricultural economics literature.1
1For example, Duﬀy (1995), Richards et al (1997), Verbeke and Ward (2001), Cotterill et al
2Recently, Dhar, Chavas, and Gould (2003) [DCG] estimated a pricing system for the
U.S. carbonated soft drink industry and rejected the commonly applied assumption
of expenditure exogeneity. The research in this study uses DCG as a key point of
departure. In particular, we begin with the AIDS structure, which provides a fully
ﬂexible functional form for the purpose of demand estimations. A common alternative
is the random coeﬃcients discrete choice model of demand. Although this model can
reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, it often imposes restrictions that
may not be implied by the general utility theory (see Bajari and Benkard (2003) for
a discussion of this point). We then incorporate risk concerns and consider demand
as operating through an almost ideal demand system. We also estimate expenditures
as endogenous to the system.
1.2 Market Value Maximization
In traditional industrial organization models, ﬁrms are assumed to maximize prof-
its. However, the proﬁt maximization assumption implicitly ignores potentially other
important considerations of the ﬁrm. In particular, ﬁrms may seek to maximize the
returns to its capital as it perceives the functioning of capital asset pricing in publicly
traded stock markets. In that sense, the ﬁrm sees a trade-oﬀ between raw short-term
proﬁt maximizing decisions and trying to endogenously control or minimize nondi-
versiﬁable risk. Firms can seldom announce list prices, contract for advertising, set
quality, and select output levels after observing demand. Instead, at least some of
these operating decisions typically must be completed ex ante, and stochastic demand
then necessitates decision-making under risk.
One of the goals in this study is to investigate ﬁrm pricing decisions building
from a model of asset value maximization under imperfect competition and uncer-
(2000), Eakins and Gallagher (2003), and Jones et al (2003).
3tainty. The vast majority of industrial organizational theory is constructed on the
premise that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts. In practice however, ﬁrm managers driven by
incentive packages may focus on equity valuation, which is only partially derived by
proﬁtability. Stability of proﬁts and demonstrating growth in proﬁts also represent
major goals of ﬁrms seeking higher equity values. In its simplest form, we might think
about a manager that is aware of ﬁnancial market factors in setting prices. When
proﬁt objectives are being exceeded, perhaps the manager opts for a more competi-
tive posture to drive up the market share. Perhaps the manager chooses to increase
promotion activities, which may drive down proﬁts but assure greater brand identity
and a perception of product sales stability. The decision trade-oﬀ arrives through
joint ﬁnancial market objectives of proﬁtability and ﬁnancial market risk. We pay
attention to risk factors when ﬁrms can choose pricing strategies and market struc-
tures. The MVM model developed in this paper is a general model with a special case
of simple proﬁt maximization. As a result, the empirical test of the single minded
proﬁt maximization objective is straightforward.
1.3 Capital Asset Pricing Model
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was independently developed by Sharpe
(1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). This model assumes that the investor’s
objective is to maximize the expected return of portfolios, subject to an acceptable
level of risk (or minimize risk, subject to an acceptable expected return). The as-
sumption of a single period, coupled with assumptions about the investor’s attitude
toward risk, allows risk to be measured by the variance (or standard deviation) of the
portfolio’s return. The CAPM states that the expected return of any risky asset is a
linear function of its tendency to co-vary with the market portfolio.
Although the single-period CAPM framework adopted in this study came under
4considerable debate during the 1990s,2 as pointed out in Frankfurter (1995), the
CAPM is still an acceptable approach for evaluating and pricing ﬁnancial assets
compared with all other methodologies. Obviously, if risk can be fully arbitraged,
then ﬁrms would not worry about risk and proceed toward proﬁt objectives. No
anecdotal or empirical evidence suggest risk transfer markets can or ever will fully
achieve such a theoretical objective. In this paper, the CAPM structure is used
primarily as tool to describe and structure the ﬁnancial market objective. The role of
ﬁnancial market risk is then allowed to enter into product market decisions to measure
their outcome. Therefore, even if CAPM is but a rough gauge of ﬁnancial market
activity, the theoretical eﬀects would not generally be overturned with a more precise
measure of ﬁnancial market behavior. Empirically, the eﬀects of ﬁnancial market risk
enter very simply into the demand system and follow the CAPM prescription for risk
management, which allows for a direct test of ﬁnancial market inﬂuence on product
markets.
1.4 New Empirical Industrial Organization
The approach of full structural estimation of all relevant ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters is a
key feature of the “new empirical industrial organization (NEIO)” (Bresnahan 1989).
A primary goal of research in this area is the understanding of ﬁrms’ competitive
interactions in a particular industry.
The NEIO estimates “conduct parameters” that reveal the nature of a ﬁrm’s
interaction with each of the other ﬁrms. Given a set of ﬁrms, the size and magnitudes
of these parameters characterize the pair-wise interaction between any two of them.
Such an approach has been referred to the conjectural variations (CV) approach in the
2See Fama and French (1992), Black (1993a, 1993b), and Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) for
details.
5economics literature, for example, Iwata (1974), and Roberts and Samuelson (1988).
An alternative to the conduct parameter framework is the “menu-approach,”
which consists of estimating various alternative games represented by the demand
and respective ﬁrst-order conditions, and identifying the best-ﬁtting game.3 The con-
duct parameter approach oﬀers the advantage that it is empirically more tractable
when the number of ﬁrms and/or the number of competitive instruments exceeds two.
However, this argument is true only when the competing games are nested in one an-
other. If non-nested models are present, it turns out that the menu-approach is more
desirable. Because the collusive games are non-nested and the Bertrand, Stackelberg
leader, Stackelberg follower, and consistent conjectures are nested in the CV games,
both the menu-approach and conduct parameters are used in the current study.
Essentially, the market structure is chosen as the model that best measures the
gap between the demand curve and the marginal cost curve. The structural ﬁrst-order
conditions are obtained like those in the much of NEIO literature. However, the cur-
rent model diﬀers in an important aspect that the objective functions of maximizing
both market values and proﬁts are considered. The strategic behaviors on the choice
variable, price, with diﬀerent combinations of Nash, Stackelberg, and collusion are
tested. Note that only pure strategies are considered to reduce the complications of
analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the demand
system and all the equations used in the estimation. In section 3 we discuss the data
issues. The details that describe estimation procedures, along with structured hy-
pothesis tests, and criteria for selecting the market structure are contained in section
4. All empirical results and discussions are collected in section 5. Finally, concluding
3See, for example, Gasmi, Laﬀont, and Vuong (1992) [GLV], Kadiyali (1996), and Vilcassim,
Kadiyali, and Chintagunta (1999) [VKC].
6remarks are provided in section 6.
2 Conceptual Model
Because the fully ﬂexible AIDS model is highly nonlinear, some assumptions on the
supply/cost side are important to reduce the complexity of analysis and make the
empirical implementation more tractable. Therefore, for the structure used in this
study, the following assumptions are maintained:
(1) Exogenous demand shifters.
(2) Constant marginal cost.
(3) Firms have full information about own/rival’s pricing strategies and cost.
(4) Firms only play pure strategies.
(5) Pricing strategies of each brand are made simultaneously.
(6) Firms use the same pricing strategies in the study period.
Assumption 1 does not apply to the endogeneity of expenditures. Assumption 2
simpliﬁes the supply of raw material and promotion expenditure used to determine
marginal costs and subsequently the output-market’s structural characteristics. This
assumption is common and performs reasonably well in structural market analysis,
for example, VKC and GLV. Assumptions 3 through 6 are to facilitate the analysis of
ﬁrm’s strategies. With full information on own/rival’s pricing strategies and cost, we
do not have to deal with games with incomplete information. Assumption 4 eliminates
formal tests of mixed strategies. Assumption 5 means that pricing strategies are made
simultaneously and/or these strategies are not contingent on each other. Assumption
6 implies neither mergers nor acquisitions are considered. For example, the well-
known case that Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) proposed to purchase Sodiaal
North America brands in the Philadelphia and New York metropolitan market area
7in Year 2000 is not considered in the study. With these assumptions at hand, we are
ready to present the conceptual model. Let us begin with the demand speciﬁcation.
2.1 Demand Speciﬁcation: AIDS
In this section we ﬁrst derive the ordinary presentation of Barten-Gorman AIDS
model.4 The modiﬁed AIDS model incorporating demographics will follow.
Let V (p,M) and E(p,u) denote indirect utility and expenditure functions deﬁned
by







0x : u(x) ≥ u},
where U(x) is the direct utility function, x is the consumption bundle of a represen-
tative consumer and x = (x1,...,xn), p is a corresponding n × 1 price vector, M is
income, and u is a reference utility level. By duality,
E(p,V (p,M)) = M, xi(p,M) = hi(p,V (p,M)),i = 1,...,n. (1)
where xi(p,M) is Marshallian demand and compensated (Hicksian) demand hi(p,u) =
∂E(p,u)/∂pi obtained via Shephard’s lemma.
In the demand analysis, it is generally desirable that a demographic modiﬁcation of
a demand system acts both through scaling, as originally proposed by Barten (1964),
and through translating, as suggested by Gorman (1976). The modiﬁcations that
scale and translate demand systems are referred as Barten-Gorman modiﬁcations.
An example of general Barten-Gorman forms of budget shares is
wi(M,p,d) = ti(d) + s(d)wi(M
∗(p,d),p,d), (2)
4More discussions on the Barten-Gorman AIDS model can be found in Perali (2003).
8where ti(d) is a translating function, s(d) is a budget share scaling function, d is a
vector of demographic variables, and M∗(p,d) is modiﬁed income.
Demand with budget shares aﬃne in the logarithm of income is the logarithmic
subclass of the Price Independent Generalized Linear (PIGL) class, which Muellbauer
(1975, 1976) terms PIGLOG. The demographically modiﬁed Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, b) are considered below. It takes
Barten-Gorman form speciﬁed as equation (2). The expenditure function associated








Taking the logarithm on equation (3) yields
lnE(p,u,d) = [lna(p,d) + b(p,d)ln(Ψ(u))] + lnp
T(p,d), (4)
where the household-speciﬁc price index lna(p,d) is speciﬁed as a translog,





































The corresponding Barten-Gorman AIDS indirect utility function linear in lnM
can be obtained from equation (4) by duality,























9where γij = (γ∗
ij + γ∗




i = pimi(d). Note
that mi(d) is a scaling demographic function. Therefore, the Barten-Gorman AIDS
ordinary budget share obtained via Roy’s identity is





j) + βi [lnM
∗ − lna(p,d)]. (8)
For empirical convenience, the translating demographic function ti(d) and the scaling










,∀r = 1,...,R. (9)
However, the choice of the functional form of the demographic function is not re-
stricted to any particular one.
With the Barten-Gorman AIDS ordinary budget share equation (8), we may in-













where Zklt = ln[dkltmk(dklt)].
Therefore, the modiﬁed AIDS model is as follows:






γij ln(pjlt) + [βi ln(Mlt) − βi ln(Plt)], (10)
i = 1,...,N;l = 1,...,L;t = 1,...,T;
where wilt = piltXilt/Mlt is the market share for the product of brand i consumed
in city i at time t, X is consumer goods, p is goods price for X, and M is total
expenditure on N goods.5 Zklt is the kth socio-demographic variable, and γij is a
cross-eﬀect of brand j’s price on the market share of brand i. βi can be interpreted
5We drop subscripts for notational simplicity wherever no confusion is caused.
10as the slope of demand function while P is a price index deﬁned by

















The theoretical structure implies symmetry restrictions (Equation (12a)) and ho-
mogeneity restrictions(Equation (12b)):












βi = 0. (12b)
To maintain theoretical consistency with the AIDS model, additional restrictions are







dir = 1, i = 1,...,N. (12c)
where νir is the parameter for brand i associated with the regional dummy variable
Dr for region r. As a result, the demand equations do not have intercept terms.
The parameter δ may be diﬃcult to estimate and is often set to some predetermined
value. We follow the approach suggested by Moschini, Moro, and Green (1994) and
set δ = 0.
2.2 The Model of Market Value Maximization
One of goals of this study is to develop hypotheses tests about the two possible
objectives of the ﬁrm: proﬁt maximization and market value maximization. The next
subsection that follows presents the market value maximization model and highlights
the diﬀerences of the two objective functions.
Before we introduce the model of MVM, the uncertainty term has to be incorpo-
rated to the analysis. The uncertainty term is assumed on the demand side only.
112.2.1 Demand Uncertainty
There are two common settings used to convey demand uncertainty: ˜ X = X + ˜ e or
˜ X = X(1 + ˜ e), where X is quantity demanded. Of course, the implications of these
two settings are very diﬀerent. We assume the managers of each brand know the
pricing strategies of other brands (i.e., market structure is known) and the prices of
raw materials, so the uncertainty comes from quantity demanded only. To facilitate
the analysis, below we assume the uncertainty is additively linear, i.e., ˜ X = X + ˜ e.
and ˜ e is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. It turns out that the
demand system incorporating the uncertainty is given by
e wilt = wilt + εilt,i = 1,...,N;l = 1,...,L;t = 1,...,T. (13)
where wilt is deﬁned in Equation (10) and e εilt = pilte eilt/Mlt, capturing the uncertainty
of the market share facing the ﬁrms.
2.2.2 First-Order Conditions for Prices under MVM
We adopt a model of MVM where the decision maker pursues the interests of risk-
averse owners of diversiﬁed-portfolio by maximizing the ﬁrm’s equilibrium value in
the capital market. To reﬂect the ﬁnancial incentives, we employ the capital asset




[E(e πh) − λCOV(e πh,e rm)], (14)
where r is the risk-free interest rate, e πh is the stochastic perpetual ﬂow of net earnings,
λ is the equilibrium shadow price of market risk reduction, deﬁned by λ = [E(e rm) −
r]/σ2
m and e rm is the stochastic rate of return of market portfolio.









[(pit − cit)(Xit + e eit) − Ui]
)
, (15)
where nh is the number of brands produced by ﬁrm h, D is the discount factor, and
Ui is the ﬁxed cost (see section 2.3 for details). Location subscript l is suppressed for
notational simplicity. Brand i of ﬁrm h faces demand function Xit = Xit(pit,p−it),
where Xit(·) can be derived from (10); p−it is pricing strategy of rival brands other
than brand i.
We then derive ﬁrst-order conditions on price. The ﬁrst-order conditions in price
of MVM are given by













The pricing conjectural variation ηji = ∂pj/∂pi is given by the brand i’s conjecture of
brand j’s price response. Note that ηji = 0, ∀j 6= i under the Bertrand competition
in price. Note that under the setup of additively linear uncertainty ˜ X = X + ˜ e the
diﬀerence between MVM and proﬁt maximization is the second term on the left side
of the equation. This also allows us to test the signiﬁcance of the ﬁnancial component.
We may introduce an additional parameter θ to construct a general MVM presen-
tation of ﬁrst-order conditions. As a result, general ﬁrst-order conditions are given
by













where θ measures how the ﬁnancial component impacts on the product market. A
positive θ implies that the decision maker considers ﬁnancial market risk when making
product market decisions. Equation (17) turns out to nest two special objectives that
ﬁrms pursue: pure MVM if θ = 1 and proﬁt maximization if θ = 0. Note that although
all of above arguments are based on the additively linear uncertainty, they can be
easily applied to a more general case.
132.3 Constant Marginal Cost
We assume constant linear marginal cost speciﬁcation which is common and performs
reasonably well in structural market analysis (see for example, VKC and GLV). The
total cost function is
TCilt = Ui + ciltXilt, (18)
where Ui is the brand speciﬁc unobservable cost component and is assumed ﬁxed (i.e.,
does not vary at the mean of the data). cilt is the observable marginal cost component
and speciﬁed as




where UPVilt is the unit per volume and represents the average size of the purchase
and MCHiltj is the in-store marketing, including price reduction and all other mer-
chandising (display and feature).
This setting is diﬀerent from that in the model without any cost information,
for example, Nevo (2001). Nevo (2001) uses the information on the demand side to
recover the constant cost by assuming the Bertrand competition while the current
study uses in-store marketing as a proxy to estimate the marginal cost. The latter
provides ﬂexibility in modeling the market structure and admits the empirical tests
among the competing models.
2.4 Expenditure Endogeneity
Following Blundell and Robin (2000) and DCG, to control expenditure endogeneity,
the reduced form expenditure equation is speciﬁed as




ζrDr + ψ1INCit + ψ2INC
2
it, t = 1,...,T, (20)
14where Trendt is a linear time trend, capturing any time speciﬁc unobservable eﬀect
on consumer’s butter and margarine expenditures. The variable INCit is median
household income in city l at time t which is used to capture the eﬀect of income
diﬀerences on butter and butter substitutes purchases.
3 Discussion of the Data
The data sets for this study are from Information Resources, Inc. (IRI), CMR, COM-
PUSTAT, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and Current Population
Survey (CPS).
3.1 IRI
The main data set from IRI consists of diﬀerent measures of sales and prices, and
in-store marketing activities. The information contains all UPC-coded products in
the margarine and butter category from retail store scanners for 32 cities/markets6
across the United States and 58 periods based on 4-week interval from January 25,
19987 to June 9, 2002. As a result, there are 13 periods in 1998-2001 and 6 periods
in 2002.
In IRI’s main dataset, there are 744 brands from 134 parent companies,8 in which
the butter category contains 351 brands while the category of butter substitutes
has 385 brands, including margarine, spreads, and butter blends. There exist no
explicit data on individual private labels; instead, IRI provides the aggregations of
6They are Atlanta, Baltimore/Washington, Boise, Boston, Buﬀalo/Rochester, Chicago, Colum-
bus, Dallas/Ft Worth, Denver, Des Moines, Detroit, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Little
Rock, Memphis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis/St Paul, New Orleans/Mobile, New York City, Okla-
homa City, Philadelphia, Phoenix/Tucson, Pittsburgh, Portland (OR), Raleigh/Greensboro, Rich-
mond/Norfolk, Salt Lake City, San Diego, San Francisco/Oakland, Seattle/Tacoma, and Tampa/St
Petersburg.
7The dates covered in the ﬁrst period are from December 29, 1997 to January 25, 1998.
8However, we only analyze 736 brands from 130 ﬁrms after dropping some unreasonable data
points.
15all branded products and private labels. Subject to the data availability and obvious
computational limitation, the estimation involved the top 3 brands, an aggregate “all
other” group and private labels. Both private labels and all others are treated as
two individual brands. That is, ﬁrms of private labels and all others are assumed
to behave coordinately, and then they have same pricing and marketing strategies
within their own categories.
[Table 1 is about here.]
As shown in Table 1, the market share of private labels is 23.95%.9 Top 3 brands
have 62.76% of market share. Figure 1 depicts the market shares by each brand.
Except the holiday seasons, the market share of each brand is stable which may
imply that this is a mature market. The volume sales of each brand are shown in
Figure 2. In Figure 2, the volume sales have four peaks which occur during the holiday
seasons from 1998 to 2001. If we closely examine Figures 1 and 2, the total volume
sales increased during the holiday seasons. However, the market share of brand 1
dropped while those of the rest increased in these periods. To adjust the seasonality,
we add 12 dummy variables (Season).10
The brand prices are presented in Figure 3. Brand 3 charges relatively high prices
because its major product is butter. We add a dummy variable (Butter) to measure
the impacts caused by this fact.
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 are about here.]
9According to previous studies, the private labels in the butter market have about 50% of market
share. However, we explore margarine and butter together here.
10Note that our main dataset is based on a 4-week interval. There are 13 periods in each year
from 1998 to 2001.
16Though there are 32 cities in the dataset, to keep panel data balanced, the ﬁnal
number of cities investigated is 28.11 Because there are 58 observations in each city,
each brand has 1624 (=58*28) complete data observations.
The variables used in the analysis consist of price, volume sales, dollar sales, unit
sales, volume per unit, in-store marketing variables: price reduction and all other
merchandising (feature and display).12
3.2 Financial Component and Simulation
Under the CAPM framework the ﬁnancial components we need are the annual rate
of return of market portfolio (e rm) and the annual risk-free rate (r), which can be
obtained from the database of Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The
annual rate of return of market portfolio is computed from CRSP Indices on S&P
500. The annual risk-free rate is based on the 90 Day Bill Returns of U.S. Treasury.
In the study period the mean of e rm is 7.35% and its standard deviation is 18.8%
whereas those of annual risk-free rate are 5.23% and 0.78% respectively.
An additional variable is the uncertainty term, e ei. It is simulated using a Monte
Carlo method. Therefore, e ei is a random drawing from a standard normal distribution
N(0,1) and the moment matching technique is used to adjust the samples. To match
the ﬁrst and second moments we calculate the mean of samples, E(e ei), and the stan-
dard deviation of the samples, σi. The adjusted samples is given by [e ei − E(e ei)]/σi,
i = 1,2,...n. These adjusted samples have the correct mean of zero and the correct
standard deviation of 1. The adjusted samples are used for all calculations. We es-
timate each model 30 times with diﬀerent draws of e ei and assume it is suﬃcient to
eliminate any noticeable error.
11Those with missing values are excluded.
12The in-store marketing is measured in dollars per pound.
173.3 Demographic Data
The demographic data consist of two parts: (1) 9 division binaries are from Census
Bureau Geography13 and (2) 7 other demographic variables are from Current Popu-
lation Survey – Annual Demographic Survey (March CPS Supplement)14 and IRI for
1998-2002. The data of CPS can be obtained by using DataFerrett15 provided by the
US Census Bureau.
The second part includes PERLT10K (percentage of household earning less than
$10,000), PERGT50K (percentage of household earning more than $50,000), HUN-
DER15 (average number of people under age 15), H NUMBER (average household
size), A AGE (median household age), FSPANISH (percentage of Hispanics), and
POPU (population).16
We merge CPS data with IRI data by using the variable of GMMSA (Geography
- MSA or PMSA FIPS Code) in the CPS database. The areas covered by CPS and
IRI are approximately the same. Furthermore, because the March CPS Supplement
database is annual, the linear projection is used to obtain the 4-week interval data.
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 summarize the discussions in this
section. In the next section we will discuss the procedures used in the estimation.
4 Estimation Procedures
The full demand system could be estimated with a full information maximum likeli-
hood that measures the wedge between price and marginal costs while simultaneously
accounting for revenue uncertainty through the CAPM structure. To explore the ef-




16Population data come from IRI.
18fects of risk, we estimate the demand system [Equations (10), (17), (19), and (20)].
The remainder of this section is devoted to describe the detail model selection proce-
dures used in this study.
4.1 Model Selection 1: MVM vs. Proﬁt Maximization
The general MVM presentation in equation (17) nests pure MVM (θ = 1) and proﬁt
maximization (θ = 0). One can test these two hypotheses by conducting the likelihood
ratio test or Wald test. The likelihood ratio statistic for model selection is given by
LR = −2[lnL(b
∗) − lnL(b)],
where b∗ is the vector of parameter estimates of either model of MVM or proﬁt
maximization; b is the vector of parameter estimates of the general model; and lnL(·)
is the log value of the likelihood function. LR has an asymptotic χ2(q) distribution,
where q is the number of restrictions imposed. That is, the degrees of freedom equal
to the diﬀerence between the number of parameters in the general model and the
restricted model (MVM or proﬁt maximization). For the current work, q = 1.
The alternative Wald test can also evaluate nested models. We brieﬂy review
below and then turn to the second set of model selection: market structure.
Let b b be the vector of parameter estimates obtained without restrictions. Suppose
the null hypothesis contains a set of restrictions
H0 : c(b) = q. (21)
If the restrictions are valid, then at least approximately b b should satisfy them. If the
hypothesis is erroneous, however, c(b b) − q should be farther from 0 than would be
explained by sampling variability alone. The Wald test is intended to formalize this
19notion. The Wald statistic is given by
W = [c(b b) − q]
0(Var[c(b b) − q])
−1[c(b b) − q]. (22)
Under H0, in large samples, W has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of restrictions; i.e., the number of equations of c(b b) − q = 0. A
large value of W leads to rejection of the hypothesis.
The advantage of the Wald test is that it only requires computation of the unre-
stricted model. However, we still need to compute the covariance matrix in Equation
(22). Since the restrictions to be investigated are linear, that is, c(b) = Rb, the Wald
statistic can be simpliﬁed as
W = [Rb − q]
0(RVar[b b]R
0)
−1[Rb − q]. (23)
The degree of freedom is the number of rows in R.
4.2 Model Selection 2: Market Structure
In this section we discuss the model selection procedures. Since we only analyze pure
strategies, managers of each brand have four strategies available: Stackelberg Leader-
ship, Stackelberg followship, non-cooperative Nash-Bertrand, and collusion. It turns
out that there are 45 possible combinations in pricing strategies to be investigated.
Given the computational requirements of the FIML estimation, it would be very
costly to actually estimate all of the possible structures in this manner. In his seminar
work, Dixit (1986) shows that most pure strategy games can be nested in a conjec-
tural variation (CV) model. The CV can be interpreted as ﬁxed points that establish
consistency between the conjecture and the reaction function associated with a par-
ticular game. As investigated in GLV the collusive game is not nested in the model
of CV. In addition to the collusive model, therefore, we can determine the strategies
20that managers of each brand use by testing the statistical signiﬁcance of the restric-
tions imposed by the games on the estimated CV parameters. The procedure of the
model selection consists of two steps:
Step I: Use the Vuong test to determine the best ﬁtted among non-nested models.
Step II: From the best ﬁtted model, estimate the CV parameters and use the Wald
test to test diﬀerent combinations of non-cooperative strategies, including Bertrand,
Stackelberg leader, Stackelberg follower, and consistent conjectures.
4.2.1 Step I
With regard to model selection, 5 possible combinations of collusions in pricing strate-
gies were considered, including C0 (each brand operates non-collusively), C1 (brand
1+brand 2), C2 (brand 1+brand 3), and C3 (brand 2+brand 3), C4 (brand 1+brand
2+brand 3). Table 4 depicts the arrangements and corresponding numbers of conjec-
tural variations of 5 models.
We do not incorporate All Others or Private Labels in the collusion analysis since
each of them consists of hundreds of individual brands. It seems reasonable to as-
sume that behaving independently is easier than behaving cooperatively for these two
aggregate brands. This assumption dramatically reduces the analysis complications.
There are 5 candidates (C0, C1, C2, C3, and C4) in pricing spaces. Thus, we need
to determine the best ﬁtted model from 5 non-nested competing ones.
It is worth mentioning that we assume that those brands outside the collusions
play CV strategies since the CV model is unrestricted and convenient for most pure
strategy games to be nested in. Another remark needs to be addressed here. To
simplify the analysis we assume that only one collusion can exist. That is, we do not
deal with the cases of more than two coalitions in the market.
The cases of C0, C1, C2, C3, and C4 in pricing space are estimated in the FIML
21estimation mentioned above and then the Vuong test is used to determine the best ﬁt-
ted model because these 5 models are non-nested. The Vuong test is brieﬂy discussed
in the next section.
4.2.2 Vuong Test
Vuong (1989) proposes a test statistic for non-nested models that is well suited for
our model selection purposes. Let fk(yt|xt) denote the predicted probability that the
random variable Y equals yt under the assumption that the distribution is fk(yt|xt),
for k = i,j, and let


























Vuong shows that V is asymptotically distributed as standard normal. The statistic
is bidirectional. If |V | is less than the critical value, the test does not favor one model
or the other; otherwise, large values favor model Fi whereas small (negative) values
favor model Fj. This implies that the test statistic not only tells us whether the
models are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other but also the sign of the test statistic
indicates which model is appropriate.
The previous tests are based on the unadjusted likelihood ratio (LR) statistic.
There are, however, many parallel statistics that can be used to form a model selection
test. We consider the following adjusted LR statistic:
f LRn(b bi, b bj) ≡ LRn(b bi, b bj) − Kn(Fi,Fj), (25)
where Kn(Fi,Fj) is a correction factor depending on the characteristics of the com-
peting models Fi and Fj such as their number of parameters. We use two ex-
22amples to illustrate the possible corrections, which are Kn(Fi,Fj) = di − dj and
Kn(Fi,Fj) = (di/2)ln(n)−(dj/2)ln(n), corresponding to Akaike (1973) and Schwarz
(1978) information criteria, where dk is the parameter number of model Fk, for
k = i,j. The adjustment is important for the competing models with diﬀerent num-
bers of parameters (like the current models) because more parameters usually imply
higher likelihoods, which needs to be corrected. At the stage of the Vuong test, as a
result, we run the unadjusted as well as two adjusted LR tests. Based on these tests,
we will select the most ﬁtted model.
4.2.3 Step II
Once obtaining the best ﬁtted model, we further explore the CV model. Since we
analyze 5 brands in this study, if every brand can be a Stackelberg leader, there
are 7 probable games for the CV models, including the Bertrand competition and
consistent conjectures, in pricing strategies. The notations below are B (Bertrand),
Si (brand i is a Stackelberg leader), i=1, 2, ..., 5, and CS (consistent conjectures).
In the CV model, CVij = 0,∀i 6= j for the Bertrand game. For the Stackelberg
game, Dixit (1986) has demonstrated that at equilibrium the CV parameter of a
Stackelberg leader should be equal to the slope of the reaction function of the follower
while follower’s CV parameter should be equal to zero.
Based on the CV estimates, we compute the slopes of the reaction function of
followers under the hypothetical Stackelberg leadership for each brand. The ﬁxed
points are identiﬁed by setting 10,000 iterations.17 Because B, S1-S5, CS are nested
in the CV model, we may test diﬀerent combinations of Bertrand, Stackelberg leader,
Stackelberg follower, and consistent conjectures by the Wald test.
17In general each converges in less than 100 iterations if the ﬁxed points do exist.
235 Empirical Results
This section contains all the results and discussions from the estimation and testing
procedures described in the previous section. We begin with the FIML estimation.
5.1 FIML Estimation
The estimation of the AIDS model, applied to the U.S. retail margarine and but-
ter market, is implemented using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
approach. The demand equations and the MVM ﬁrst-order conditions as well as
marginal costs and expenditure endogeneity are jointly estimated. The estimation is
run for 3 ﬁrm-level brands, an aggregate category for all other brands, and a ﬁnal cat-
egory for private label brands, in which Brand 1 and 2 produce margarine and Brand
3 produces butter only while All Others and Private Labels produce both butter and
margarine. Starting values are determined from a linearized version of the demand
equations and the convergence criterion for the gradients is set at 0.0001.
Note that, by deﬁnition,
P5
i=1 wi = 1, where wi is the expenditure share of good
i. Thus, the dependent variables are linearly dependent, implying the singularity of
the variance of the error terms. Practically this singularity problem can be handled
by dropping one equation, thus estimating the remaining 4 demand equations. The
parameters from the equation dropped can be recovered from the homogeneity re-
strictions. As a result, the FIML estimation in this study consists of 10 equations in
the system, including 4 demand equations, 5 ﬁrst-order conditions, and 1 equation
for expenditure endogeneity.
With regard to numbers of parameters in the estimation, there are 91 demand-
related parameters from equation (10), 12 expenditure endogeneity parameters from
equation (20), 20 marginal cost parameters from equation (19). For equation (17)
24the parameters include 1 ﬁnance component and the price conjectural variation (CV)
whose number depends on the market structure speciﬁed in each competing model
detailed in column (4) in Table 4.18 See Table 2 for more details.
[Table 2 is about here.]
Using standard model selection criterion, we select ﬁrm’s objective and the mar-
ket structure that best ﬁt the data and impose that structure on all other analyses.
Section 5.2 and 5.3 contains the results of the model selection procedures. Section 5.2
examines the assessment of the market value maximization principal. In particular, a
restricted (proﬁt maximization) system is estimated and tested versus an unrestricted
system (general market value maximization). The Lerner index, price, and expendi-
ture elasticities are computed based on the best ﬁtted model determined in section
5.3. While price and expenditure elasticities are presented and discussed in section
5.4, serving as a benchmark, the Lerner indexes under the proﬁt maximization and
Bertrand assumption in pricing are also reported in section 5.5. Note that all tables
of empirical results are collected in the end of the paper.
5.2 Model Selection 1: MVM vs. Proﬁt Maximization
One of our major research objectives is to explore whether ﬁrm level ﬁnancial com-
ponents can eﬀect product market strategies. As indicated in equation (17), proﬁt
maximization is shown as simply a special case of the more general MVM model. In
the ﬁrst order condition, the general form contains the term λCOV(e ei,e rm). There-
fore, testing the signiﬁcance of this term requires one additional parameter to be esti-
mated. The purpose of conducting this test is to highlight the importance of market
18The full parameter set is available upon request.
25risk components, which are widely ignored in the traditional industrial organization
literature.
The Wald test and likelihood ratio test are used to test if ignoring ﬁnancial com-
ponents is acceptable. The Monte Carlo method is employed to simulate the risk
components. The MVM model is estimated 30 times with diﬀerent draws of the
uncertainty term and is assumed suﬃcient to eliminate any noticeable errors. The
results are reported in Table 3.19 The range of estimated θ is from 0.3252 to 0.3751
while the mean is 0.3456. The Wald statistics are more than 1000 and the LR statis-
tics are more than 250 in all draws, which demonstrate the statistical signiﬁcance of
the ﬁnancial component. Thus, a signiﬁcant ﬁnding is that ﬁnancial market risk has
an important role that shapes the strategic interaction among ﬁrms in the margarine
and butter market.
Because the traditional industrial organization approach concerns more proﬁt than
market value objectives, much of our attention is paid to the general MVM against
proﬁt maximization. That is, we care more about whether θ > 0 than whether θ = 1.
The mean of estimated θ, 0.3456, which is diﬀerent from the theoretical prediction, 1
might be due to the assumption of the additively linear uncertainty, the restrictions
of CAPM, and not incorporating the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms, for example, debts
and equities in the study. Though the null hypothesis θ = 1 is also rejected in the
test (not reported here), the decision maker always has ﬁnancial concerns as long as
θ > 0. The results reported in Table 3 provide suﬃcient evidence to support this
concern.
19Table 3 is based on model C0 mentioned in section 4.2. We also conduct the same tests for
model C1-C4. The general results are held; i.e., θ = 0 is rejected across models C0-C4 though we
do not report the statistics here.
265.3 Model Selection 2: Market Structure
In the second set of model selection, 5 possible combinations of collusions in pricing
strategies were considered, including C0 (each brand operates non-collusively), C1
(brand 1+brand 2), C2 (brand 1+brand 3), and C3 (brand 2+brand 3), C4 (brand
1+brand 2+brand 3). Table 4 depicts the arrangements and corresponding numbers
of conjectural variations of 5 models.
To identify the best ﬁtted market structures in pricing, we perform the model
selection procedure speciﬁed in section 4.1. The results are reported in Table 4:
Column 1-Voung Test (VT); column 2-Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); column
3-Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The numbers in each row indicate how the
best model (model C0) performs relative to the others. Because the statistics are all
greater than 1.96, the Vuong test and its adjustments (AIC and SIC) indicate that
model C0 is the best ﬁtted model, in which each brand operates non-collusively in
price.
5.3.1 CV Parameters
Table 5 shows the CV estimates of price. All 20 pricing CVs are signiﬁcant. Moreover,
there are 13 negative pricing CV estimates; that is, not all brands raise prices when
its competitors do so.
Clearly, the market pricing we observe does not ﬁt the classic case of price games
under product diﬀerentiation. Part of the reason may come in the inability of whole-
salers to quickly respond to competitor price changes. Given that supermarkets con-
trol retail prices, the time delays related to a reaction may be a limiting factor for
our model. This can be noted in the last column of Table 5 where all of the branded
products react to price decreases (increases) with price increases (decreases). The
results also seem to suggest that butter and margarine are not overly competitive
27groups in the spreadable fats food category.
This result is also probably best explained by lack of resale price maintenance
on the part of brand wholesalers. Supermarkets have control over ﬁnal prices and
the nonresponsiveness may indeed be the exercise of retailer market power, or the
interaction of private label pricing, which the supermarket may have an incentive to
promote, and branded products.
5.3.2 Wald Test
In this section we further examine what identifying market structures ﬁt data better.
Based on the results obtained in Step I of the model selection procedures, the CV
model of C0 is investigated in more detail. The Wald test is used to complete Step II
of model selection in this section. To test the Stackelberg games, the slopes of reaction
functions of followers have to be estimated ﬁrst. They are computed at the means of
relevant variables. These results are presented in Table 6. The computations of ﬁxed
points indicate that all of S1-S5 and CS can be candidates of Stackelberg leaders.
Table 6 indicates that the slopes of reaction functions for all hypothetical cases must
be negative to sustain the models of Stackelberg or consistent conjectures in price.
Once the slopes of reaction functions are calculated, the Wald test is ready to be
implemented. The results are presented in Table 7. As shown in the table, all diﬀerent
combinations of Bertrand, Stackelberg leadership, and consistent conjectures for the
pricing strategies are rejected. The result implies that the CV model for pricing
strategies in model C0, where each brand operates non-collusively in price, is the
ﬁnal winner.
After the best ﬁtted model is determined, we then work on the price and expen-
diture elasticities derived from this model in Tables 8 and 9.
285.4 Elasticities
The results for determining the best ﬁtted market structure was discussed in section
5.3. We now report the price elasticity matrix derived from this market structure in
Table 8 while the expenditure elasticities are reported in Table 9.20
In Table 8, own price elasticities are all signiﬁcantly negative. The elasticities of
all highly diﬀerentiated products maintain inelastic demand. As mentioned before,
since All Others and Private Labels are aggregated from hundreds of diﬀerentiated
niche-type products, it is not surprising that this group of products is relatively
inelastic in price. Brand 1 is more inelastic than brands 2 and 3, which supports the
notion that this dominant ﬁrm may have strong customer loyalty and strategies to
diﬀerentiate these lines have been successful. Brands 2 and 3 are relatively more price
sensitive than the other brands in the study. Perhaps this signals relatively less brand
loyalty, poor diﬀerentiation strategies, and other factors that limit these brands from
improving their market position relative to brand 1 or private labels.
Moving to cross elasticities, brand 1 and 2 are found to be substitutes, which was
not surprising given that both are margarine lines, while there are not clear relation-
ships between brands 1 and 3 and brands 2 and 3. The negative cross elasticities of
the rest of products imply they are roughly complements. The result is consistent
with Gould, Cox, and Perali (1991), where diﬀerent food fats and oils, including but-
ter, margarine, short, cooking, and lard are generally complements. Alternatively,
the negative cross elasticities might be due to that retail ﬁrms control ﬁnal prices
than any true complementary relationship. For example, when branded products are
oﬀered at lower prices, supermarkets can instantaneously react by lowering the price
of its own private labels.
20The elasticity estimates can be derived from the AIDS model. They are all computed at the
means of relevant variables and the associated standard errors are obtained by the delta method.
29The expenditure elasticities are reported in Table 9. All are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Recall that brand 3, All Others and Private Labels all have sig-
niﬁcant butter components aggregated within while brands 1 and 2 are lower priced,
margarine brands. Private Labels, All Others, and brand 3 are above unity, consis-
tent with the ﬁnding that these items contain butter products and generally charge
relatively higher prices.
5.5 Lerner Indexes
The Lerner indexes of the best ﬁtted model are shown in column (2) of Table 10.
The range of Lerner indexes are from 0.0092 (All Others) to 0.2821 (brand 3). The
lowest Lerner index of All Others is consistent with the smaller market shares. From
brands 1, 2, and 3, it indicates that branded butter producers may have higher market
power than branded margarine ones in the current analysis. Within the category of
margarine, brand 1 has more market power than brand 2 because of brand 1’s larger
market share. Private Labels also have a higher Lerner index, which is consistent
with growing market power of supermarkets in the spreadable fats category.
To examine how the speciﬁcation of market structure inﬂuences the estimation
of Lerner index, we use the Bertrand assumption as a benchmark because this is
often an assumed market structure for many retail studies on diﬀerentiated products.
Columns (1) in Table 10 reports the estimated Lerner indexes for the Bertrand model,
which indicates that ﬁrms in the diﬀerentiated product market have signiﬁcant market
power. The Lerner indexes in the best ﬁtted model [columns (2)] are quite diﬀerent
relative to those obtained from the assumption of Bertrand competition [columns (1)].
The result demonstrates the importance of selecting the correct market structure.
From comparisons of Lerner indexes, it is easy to see that the Bertrand competition
commonly seen in the study of the diﬀerentiated products might be misspeciﬁed and
30the Lerner indexes are sensitive to the speciﬁcation of market structure.
We further compare the Lerner indexes of MVM and proﬁt maximization models.
Column (3) shows that the model of proﬁt maximization estimates higher Lerner
indexes. The average Lerner index of proﬁt maximization is greater than that of
MVM by 5.08% with a range of 51.09% (All Others) to 1.10% (Brand 3). This result is
consistent with the theoretical ﬁndings and supports the concept that Lerner indexes
generated under proﬁt maximization are overstated in the presence of ﬁnancial risk.
However, the nominally high estimated Lerner indexes presented here should be
interpreted carefully. The marginal costs may be under-estimated because in-store
marketing has been used as a proxy because real wholesale cost information of branded
butter and margarine were not available. This under-estimation of marginal costs
applies to both models of MVM and proﬁt maximization. It is believed that the
over-estimated Lerner index under proﬁt maximization setting still holds when more
accurate cost information is incorporated.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this study we have presented and discussed results on the strategic pricing behav-
ior in the U.S. margarine and butter markets. A general model of oligopoly strategic
behavior is developed for ﬁrms choosing to maximize the market value of their assets.
In section 2 we develop and implement a model built on the nonlinear Almost Ideal
Demand Systems (AIDS) and structural ﬁrst-order conditions for market value max-
imization. The underlying deﬁnition of the MVM is constructed using the capital
asset pricing model, which focuses on proﬁts and revenue stability.
Section 3 addresses the issues of data sets used in the study. The empirical
procedures are detailed in section 4 where estimation of demand systems and the
31model selection procedures are discussed step by step. Section 5 then presents the
empirical ﬁndings in this study. Using retail scanner data on the U.S. margarine
and butter industry from 1998 to 2002, full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
estimations of the nonlinear AIDS model and structural ﬁrst-order conditions in price
are obtained.
From the FIML estimation, the test of diﬀerent ﬁrm’s objectives is a straightfor-
ward likelihood ratio or Wald test because strict proﬁt maximization is shown to be
nested within the MVM framework. The restricted model is soundly rejected and we
conclude that ﬁnancial market uncertainty plays an important role in determining
the pricing behavior of ﬁrms in this industry. In particular, MVM ﬁrms are likely to
spend more attention to product diﬀerentiation than the strict proﬁt maximizers.
The MVM model also suggests traditional Lerner indexes will be estimated above
their true values. This is a simple misspeciﬁcation bias that ignores the returns
required to compensate ﬁrms for nondiversiﬁable risk. When ignores, Lerner indexes
conclude these required returns are rents extracted due to classic forms of market
power. Thus when an industry is characterized by MVM, it produces a more valid
and stronger test of market power. When market power is identiﬁed, the signal of
noncompetitive prices is stronger because risk has been accounted for. This is a crucial
ﬁnding in light of the current state of industrial organization work and antitrust law:
First and foremost, the results show that models built under the premise of static
proﬁt maximization are likely to overstate the case of high levels of economic proﬁt.
However, by setting the analytical bar higher and more accurately, the cases in which
high Lerner indexes emerge, after accounting for an appropriate risk premium, should
warrant more attention from antitrust authorities. Second, this study points out a
very important part of why ﬁrms may merge and antitrust law needs to account for
this. For example, it is often argued that vertical integration generates transaction
32base eﬃciency gains. It is reasonable to assume that if these gains cut the variability of
returns, then we should observe, ceteris paribus, an increase in the Lerner index. The
evaluation of past mergers in this light would be a useful extension of this research.
Merger approvals based on Chicago School eﬃciency arguments need to more formally
consider the role of eﬃciency in reducing the variability of returns and subsequently
demand greater downward pressure on expected Lerner indexes.
The Vuong test, the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria suggest the best
ﬁtted model is the one in which each brand operates non-collusively in prices. The
Wald test supports the ﬁnding that all of Bertrand, Stackelberg leadership, and con-
sistent conjectures in pricing should be rejected. Given the rather strong results from
the model selection, we proceeded to estimate elasticities and Lerner index to explore
market power in this market.
6.1 Contributions
The research in this study provides several important additions and extensions to
the literature. First, we are not aware of any previous attempt to estimate a ﬂexible
demand system while introducing ﬁnancial market risk into the market structure. The
results push the literature toward a richer model of ﬁrm behavior that endogenously
considers ﬁnancial market components in estimating traditional measures of market
power, and pricing parameters from demand systems.
Second, this is a very large system comprised of three brands, an aggregation of all
other brands and an aggregation of private labels. Most previous brand level studies
have either worked with multiple brands in the pricing system alone, or worked with a
few brands, and used linear ad hoc demand systems to estimate the demand system.
This research, therefore represents an extension of the AIDS model to address pricing
and ﬁnancial risk in a disaggregated system.
33Last, though not least, there has been no previous attempt to evaluate pricing
strategies in the U.S. margarine and butter retail markets. The results presented in
this study indicate that the empirical implementations are sensitive to model speci-
ﬁcations. From comparisons of Lerner indexes in Table 10, for example, it is easy to
see that the Bertrand competition commonly seen in the study of the diﬀerentiated
products might be misspeciﬁed given that the best ﬁtted market structure is other
than the Bertrand competition. A misspeciﬁed mode of interactions may result in
bad estimates and lead to wrong policy implications. It is believed that this study
helps us better understand the U.S. margarine and butter markets and the analysis
framework can be easily applied to any diﬀerentiated product markets.
6.2 Future Research
Finally we point out some possible avenues of research in the future. First, as men-
tioned above, issues of market power analyses arising from market structure changes,
for example, vertical integration and merger should receive more attention in the
context of risk concerns.
Second, we do not consider all possible games in the model selection stage. It may
well be that some complex game not considered would appear consistent with the CV
model. In addition, the estimations only involve ﬁrm’s pure strategies in pricing and
leaves out the possibility of mixed or dynamic strategies.21 Though the pure strategy
games considered in this study can be treated as degenerate cases of mixed strategy
games, it is possible that actual behavior involves games with mixed strategies.
Third, the current study uses in-store marketing as a proxy to estimate the
marginal costs. This provides the ﬂexibility in modeling the market structure and
21Examples of mixed strategy estimation can be found in Golan, Karp and Perloﬀ (2000) and
references therein.
34admits empirical tests among the competing models compared with other studies lack
of cost data. The results may be improved by estimating real costs of wholesale inputs
and in-store marginal costs rather than using a proxy.
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share (%)  
Total Revenue 
($M/city) 
BR1 (M)  1.18  (0.17)  37.50  (6.85)  29.81  (6.26)  40.75  (29.64) 
BR2 (M)  1.05  (0.22)  15.66  (9.69)  13.66  (7.48)  15.06  (8.99) 
BR3 (B)  3.40  (0.62)  9.60  (4.46)  16.43  (7.62)  29.69  (37.94) 
AO (M&B)  2.19  (0.51)  13.29  (8.80)  14.59  (10.59)  26.87  (42.01) 










All Others (%) 
[Display & Feature] 
BR1 (M)  0.77  (0.07)  24.37  (9.03)  9.57  (6.90)  14.80  (8.32) 
BR2 (M)  0.91  (0.06)  31.21  (13.75)  12.56  (8.74)  18.65  (12.66) 
BR3 (B)  1.13  (0.06)  36.89  (23.42)  17.50  (16.04)  19.39  (20.49) 
AO (M&B)  1.06  (0.08)  24.45  (15.42)  13.17  (9.84)  11.28  (12.60) 
PL (M&B)  0.90  (0.09)  38.53  (21.41)  16.20  (13.97)  22.33  (17.73) 
 
Mean Values of Other Explanatory Variables 
Variables  Units  Mean  Variables  Units  Mean 
PERLT10K  %  8.64  (3.22)  Median Income  $  44317.32  (6484.37) 
PERGT50K  %  44.03  (6.63)  Per Capita Expenditure  $  0.72  (0.19) 
HUNDER15  #  0.58  (0.09)  m r   %  7.35  (18.80) 
H_NUMBER  #  2.57  (0.16)  f r   %  5.23  (0.78) 
A_AGE  Years  34.01  (2.42)         
FSPANISH  %  13.40  (10.74)         
POPU  #  3651213  (3361325)         
 
Note: 
(1) Product produced: M=margarine; B=butter. 
(2) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
(3) BR1~BR3: Brand 1~Brand 3, AO: All Others, PL: Private Labels. 
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Private LabelsTable 2 Numbers of Parameters in FIML Estimation
Equation Parameter Number Note
10 νr 36 division binary, r = 1...9.
λk 28 socio-demographic variable, k = 1...7.
β 4 income term in AIDS
γ 10 cross price eﬀect in AIDS
Season 12 seasonality dummy
Butter 1 butter dummy
20 ζr 9 regional dummy in income, r = 1...9.
ξ, ψ1, ψ2 3 time trend, median income and its square
19 µ0 5 intercept term
µ1 5 unit per volume
µ21 5 all other merchandising
µ22 5 price reduction
17 η * CV in price
θ 1 Finance component
* Numbers depend on the market structure. See column (4) in Table 4.
v 
  vi 
Table 3  Wald Test and Likelihood Ratio Test for Financial Component 












1  0.3569  0.0098  1338.04  354.49 
2  0.3527  0.0087  1630.99  365.42 
3  0.3458  0.0075  2142.03  355.11 
4  0.3330  0.0082  1654.55  381.26 
5  0.3783  0.0063  3633.31  252.00 
6  0.3690  0.0079  2178.67  289.22 
7  0.3669  0.0103  1258.21  442.44 
8  0.3208  0.0078  1698.22  395.88 
9  0.3451  0.0083  1712.88  355.79 
10  0.3301  0.0082  1611.63  367.73 
11  0.3676  0.0095  1503.89  462.89 
12  0.3346  0.0078  1820.77  392.40 
13  0.3442  0.0076  2054.92  366.42 
14  0.3467  0.0090  1468.48  432.95 
15  0.3517  0.0074  2230.45  327.26 
16  0.3336  0.0070  2245.63  382.20 
17  0.3510  0.0096  1344.35  365.03 
18  0.3751  0.0101  1387.73  287.55 
19  0.3573  0.0073  2365.81  356.31 
20  0.3480  0.0091  1468.77  429.54 
21  0.3255  0.0083  1536.45  391.12 
22  0.3458  0.0080  1863.96  383.16 
23  0.3372  0.0077  1922.31  384.77 
24  0.3322  0.0071  2187.97  369.22 
25  0.3408  0.0083  1681.56  403.32 
26  0.3252  0.0076  1807.23  379.63 
27  0.3472  0.0081  1854.66  445.08 
28  0.3348  0.0073  2102.72  385.18 
29  0.3385  0.0106  1028.39  387.52 
30  0.3331  0.0091  1339.98  361.41 
Note: The critical values at the 5% level of significance are 3.84  
for both the Wald test and the LR test. 
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Table 4  Vuong Test (Model C0 versus the Rest) 
 
Model  (1) VT  (2) AIC  (3) SIC  (4) # of CV 
C0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  20 
C1  6.7337  6.7256  6.7038  18 
C2  8.0815  8.0730  8.0501  18 
C3  7.5138  7.5052  7.4822  18 
C4  13.7437  13.7193  13.6537  14 
 
Note: 
(1)  C0: each brand operates non-collusively 
C1: Brand 1+Brand 2 
C2: Brand 1+Brand 3 
C3: Brand 2+Brand 3 
C4: Brand 1+Brand 2+Brand 3 
(2)  The numbers in column (1)-(3) indicate the Vuong statistics under the different criteria, 
which measure how mode1 C0 is superior to the others. For example, the four entries of 
model C1 mean model C0 is better than model C1 by those amounts. The critical values 






















BR1  NA  1.7761  0.1759  -0.4575  -2.1567 
    (0.0855)  (0.0073)  (0.0142)  (0.2290) 
BR2  -0.5041  NA  -0.1403  0.2519  -0.1600 
  (0.0254)    (0.0073)  (0.0074)  (0.0077) 
BR3  -0.3915  -0.5533  NA  -0.3071  -0.5928 
  (0.0225)  (0.0281)    (0.0095)  (0.0325) 
AO  0.3878  0.1295  -0.1466  NA  -0.2019 
  (0.0207)  (0.0058)  (0.0067)    (0.0095) 
PL  -1.3391  0.7934  0.5110  -1.2194  NA 
  (0.0780)  (0.0358)  (0.0258)  (0.0373)   
 
Note: 
(1) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
(2) Highlighted numbers are significant at the 5% level of significance. 
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Table 6(a)  The Fixed Points If Brand 1 is a Stackelberg Leader in Price 







BR1  BR2  BR3  AO  PL 
  BR1  1.0000  -0.9108  -1.0783  -1.1225  -1.3362 
  BR2  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
i  BR3  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  AO  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000 
  PL  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
 
 
Table 6(b)  The Fixed Points If Brand 2 is a Stackelberg Leader in Price 







BR1  BR2  BR3  AO  PL 
  BR1  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  BR2  -0.8698  1.0000  -0.9315  -0.9866  -0.9785 
i  BR3  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  AO  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000 
  PL  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
 
 
Table 6(c)  The Fixed Points If Brand 3 is a Stackelberg Leader in Price 







BR1  BR2  BR3  AO  PL 
  BR1  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  BR2  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
i  BR3  -0.9904  -0.9211  1.0000  -0.9778  -0.9562 
  AO  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000 
  PL  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
 
 
Table 6(d)  The Fixed Points If AO is a Stackelberg Leader in Price 







BR1  BR2  BR3  AO  PL 
  BR1  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  BR2  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
i  BR3  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  AO  -1.1323  -1.0756  -1.0711  1.0000  -1.2924 
  PL  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
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Table 6(e)  The Fixed Points If PL is a Stackelberg Leader in Price 







BR1  BR2  BR3  AO  PL 
  BR1  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  BR2  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
i  BR3  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  AO  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000 
  PL  -1.2668  -1.0424  -1.0452  -1.2803  1.0000 
 
 
Table 6(f)  The Fixed Points If Consistent Conjectures in Price 







BR1  BR2  BR3  AO  PL 
  BR1  1.0000  -0.8573  -1.0939  -1.3695  -1.8240 
  BR2  -0.9346  1.0000  -1.0271  -1.3071  -1.5389 
i  BR3  -0.9989  -0.8607  1.0000  -1.1482  -1.3049 
  AO  -0.9900  -0.8884  -0.9517  1.0000  -1.5670 




Table 7  Wald Test Statistic (Model C0) 
 
Type of Game  Wald Statistic 
B  19663.67   
S1  45089.97   
S2  59223.93   
S3  15605.38   
SAO  71549.50   
SPL  23739.80   
CS  151885.26   
Note: 
(1) The degree of freedom for all tests is 20 and the critical value is 31.41 at the 5% level of 
significance. 
(2) B means Bertrand, Si means that brand i is a Stackelberg leader, and CS means consistent 
conjectures.  
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BR1  -0.5561  0.1327  0.0425  -0.0348  -0.2733 
  (0.0096)  (0.0033)  (0.0027)  (0.0036)  (0.0097) 
BR2  0.3329  -0.7873  0.1086  -0.1183  -0.0734 
  (0.0081)  (0.0055)  (0.0045)  (0.0073)  (0.0115) 
BR3  -0.0714  -0.0013  -0.8383  -0.0524  -0.1868 
  (0.0030)  (0.0023)  (0.0064)  (0.0025)  (0.0075) 
AO  -0.2514  -0.2169  -0.0800  -0.0925  -0.6212 
  (0.0063)  (0.0059)  (0.0032)  (0.0242)  (0.0250) 
PL  -0.5071  -0.1441  -0.1662  -0.3811  -0.1659 
  (0.0119)  (0.0059)  (0.0057)  (0.0144)  (0.0188) 
 
 






BR1  0.6872  
  (0.0105) 
BR2  0.6315  
  (0.0162) 
BR3  1.2220  
  (0.0057) 
AO  1.2711  
  (0.0170) 
PL  1.2648  
  (0.0160) 
Note: 
(1) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
(2) Highlighted numbers are significant at the 5% level of significance. 
(3) BR1~BR3: Brand 1~Brand 3, AO: All Others, PL: Private Labels. 
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BR1  0.3492  0.2694  0.2893   7.39 
  (0.0140)  (0.0165)  (0.0129)   
BR2  0.3095  0.2471  0.2621   6.07 
  (0.0234)  (0.0252)  (0.0214)   
BR3  0.4084  0.2821  0.2852   1.10 
  (0.0097)  (0.0088)  (0.0077)   
AO  0.4001  0.0092  0.0139  51.09 
  (0.0382)  (0.0983)  (0.1232)   
PL  0.3527  0.2478  0.2587   4.40 
  (0.0186)  (0.0172)  (0.0136)   
Note: 
(1) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
(3) BR1~BR3: Brand 1~Brand 3, AO: All Others, PL: Private Labels. 
 